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Abstract
Over the past century in six major economies economic growth 
has been strongly associated with machinery investment, as is the 
case for a larger group of nations since 1950. The macroeconomic 
patterns and narratives o f the history of technology both suggest 
that this association is causal—that a high rate of machinery 
investment appears a necessary prerequisite for rapid long-run 
growth—and points away from the possibilities that rapid growth is 
the cause of high machinery investment, or that a high rate of 
machinery investment is a good proxy for other factors that are 
important causes of growth.
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Machinery investment and productivity growth have been strongly 
associated over the past century in six industrial nations for which data are 
available: Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. A similar association holds since World War II for a broader sample of 
nations.1 Narratives of individual nations’ economic histories have frequently 
noted such an association.2 Moreover, there are signs that a large part of this 
association is causal: high machinery investment appears to generate rapid 
growth.
This article begins by sketching some issues at stake in the debate over the 
role o f machinery accumulation in growth. I then presents the data used, and 
raise some questions about their reliability before documenting the association of 
machinery investment and growth. Later sections address issues of causality— 
does high machinery investment cause fast growth, or does fast growth lead to 
high machinery investment?—and fit the macro patterns found here to the micro 
patterns found in the narratives written by historians of technology.
Economic historians have long stressed the role of mechanization in the 
multiplication of productivity over the past two centuries. The industrial nations 
are today more than eight times as wealthy as they were a century ago because 
they can and have poured resources into making the machines that embody the 
technologies of the Industrial Revolution. Factors supporting high machinery
1See De Long and Summers, “Equipment Investment and Economic Growth.”
2For example, Hayn, “Capital Formation and Argentina’s Price Cost Structure”; and Diaz- 
Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic argued that Argentina’s 
extraordinarily poor performance since World War II was due to a low rate of machinery 
investment in machinery resulting from counterproductive policies. Hill, “Growth and 
Investment According to International Comparisons,” found a strong bivariate association 
between machinery investment and growth between 1954 and 1962 in OECD countries. De Long 
and Summers, “Equipment Investment and Economic Growth,” found a strong association 
between machinery investment and growth between 1950 and 1985 for a broad sample of 




























































































investment are given a prominent role in historians’ narratives and are in the 
foreground of the pictures drawn by Rostow, Gerschenkron, Rosenberg, Landes, 
Pollard, and many others.3
Development and growth economists have tended to take another direction. 
They have often concluded that the role of accumulation has been overstressed 
and other factors—such as widespread formal education, the exploitation of 
economies of scale, appropriate terms of trade, the overcoming of structural 
rigidities, and the repairing of market failures—are more central to growth and 
development.4 Studies in the growth-accounting tradition of Solow have been 
interpreted as revealing that capital deepening is responsible for only a small 
part of productivity growth.5 The general drift o f this line of thought is that 
rapid machinery accumulation is neither sufficient nor necessary for economic 
growth: investing in formal education, overcoming bottlenecks, and removing 
inefficiencies in the use of resources are more strategic tolong-run growth than 
accumulating machinery.
This article reaffirms the Gerschenkronian and Rostovian view. The macro 
patterns it finds suggest that machinery investment is a very good candidate for 
the starring role of strategic factor in economic growth. Moreover, the macro 
pattern fits well with the micro narratives of technological historians. Rosenberg 
is only one of many who argue, on the basis of micro studies of innovation, that 
the construction, acquisition, and installation of machines is a key link in
3See Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth', Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective-, Rosenberg, “Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic Growth”; Landes, The 
Unbound Prometheus', Pollard, Peaceful Conquest', and Blanqui, Histoire de I’Economie Politique 
in Europe.
4Rostow, Theorists o f Economic Growth , surveys the development of theories of economic 
growth. Clark, Conditions o f Economic Progress was among the first to argue that capital 
deepening was not responsible for the bulk of growth.
5For example, see Datta-Chadhuri’s claim in “Market Failure and Government Failure” that 
“Solow ...demonstrated that only a small part of...growth...can be explained by...physical 
capital.” Solow’s “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function” is more restrained. 




























































































economic development.6 I suggest here that the pictures of trees sketched by 
technological historians give a good view of the forest as well.
DATA
This study covers six nations—Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States—over eight periods— 1870 to 1885, 1885 to 
1900, 1900 to 1913, 1913 to 1929, 1929 to 1938, 1938 to 1950, and 1950 to 1965, 
and 1965 to 1980.7 The fifteen-year frequency of observation, with some dates 
offset to better match the cycle and the eras of war and peace, was chosen to 
reveal long-run shifts in growth rates instead of short-run cyclical fluctuations.8
The nations were chosen on the basis of data availability. Long-run national 
product estimates of the necessary quality are rare; these six countries had the 
best data. They make up a substantial part of the industrial world, accounting 
for roughly 60 percent of total world economic product today and perhaps 40 
percent in 1870.9
In choosing among the different estimates of growth rates and investment 
shares, I stayed as close as possible to the estimates compiled by Maddison, 
whose database has had a substantial influence on conceptions of long-run
6See Rosenberg, “Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry.”
7The data for Canada are relatively poor before 1929, and are not used. The German data used 
cover only West Germany after World War II.
*The 1913 to 1929 period ends on the eve of the Great Depression, thus containing all of World 
War I and subsequent business cycles leading up to the end of the 1920s boom. And the 1938 to 
50 period ends when post-World War II reconstruction had been substantially completed.
9A seventh once-rich nation, Argentina, is of extraordinary interest as discussed in the text. 
Inclusion of Argentina would help to control for a potential sample selection problem—since all of 
the nations in the sample have done well, perhaps they are unrepresentative. But Argentina 
cannot be reliably included in the statistical analysis. If it were included, the coefficients 
estimated for the regressions would be very similar, but the standard errors of the coefficients 




























































































growth in a comparative perspective.10 Thus my estimates of output per capita 
were drawn from his Phases o f Capitalist Development. Those estimates of 
relative past output levels were derived by extrapolating growth rates as given 
by nation-specific studies backward from a current benchmark. Growth was 
measured using different price vectors: for example, the prices in which 
Japanese growth from 1965 to 1980 was calculated were not the relative prices 
in which German growth from 1900 1913 was calculated. There is no good reason 
to believe that the different output growth rates reported by Maddison are fully 
consistent with each other.
The estimates of machinery investment were compiled from individual 
national sources.11 The same potential inconsistencies are thus present in the
10Out of those cross-country estimates available, Maddison’s database one of the most 
comprehensive and certainly the best documented. See Angus Maddison, Phases o f Capitalist 
Development, and Economic Growth in the Twentieth Century. However, Maddison’s estimates 
are not immune from challenge. See Jan de Vries, “The Decline and Rise of the Dutch Economy,” 
for a convincing argument that Maddison’s estimates of Dutch nineteenth century growth are 
substantially awry. J. Bradford De Long, “Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: 
Comment,” makes some skeptical observations on some of the estimates in Phases of Capitalist 
Development, particularly for Japan and Scandinavia. Nevertheless, future challengers and 
revisors of Maddison must begin where his work leaves off—and his work has made that of 
potential revisionists much easier. For estimates of comparative living standards made via wage 
levels compared using contemporary purchasing power parity benchmarks, see Jeffrey 
Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor Markets.” Williamson’s estimates find sufficiently 
large discrepancies to be worrisome, but not large enough to fully invalidate Maddison’s 
database. On the other hand, Mulhall’s Industries and Wealth of Nations contains contemporary 
estimates of the industries and wealth of nations that have a correlation for the sample used 
here (excluding Japan) of 0.98 with Maddison’s estimates.
11Sources of pre-World War II data on capital stock estimates and investment shares are as 
follows. For Canada, only official post-1929 data are available. A more detailed picture of earlier 
growth could be constructed by extrapolating from the individual years covered by Firestone, 
Canada's Economic Development, but the data will not bear the weight of such extrapolation. For 
Germany, the estimates used are Maddison’s revisions in Phases of Capitalist Development of 
W.G. Hoffman et al.’s estimates in Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft. Before 1929, the 
underlying estimates of the German capital stock are “net concept” estimates. All other estimates 
used are “gross concept” estimates. Italian machinery and equipment data are derived from Fua, 
ed., Lo Sviluppo Economico in Italia, for the pre-World War II period, and from Summers and 
Heston, “The Penn World Table, Version V,” thereafter. Japanese data are derived from Ohkawa, 
Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics o f Japan since 1868, for the pre-World War II 
period, and from “Penn World Table V” for the post-World War II period. United Kingdom data 
are taken from Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure, and Output in the United Kingdom. For 
the United States, the estimates for the post-1929 period are the official Department of 





























































































investment estimates as well. Prices used differ across countries and in some 
cases across periods. I gambled that such inconsistencies do not corrupt the 
conclusions, but my findings cannot be used to draw strong lessons about 
characteristics and patterns of growth in any one country relative to others in 
the sample. Statements about the deviations of national patterns from the 
average pattern found in the sample, derived from the data used in this paper, 
may well be misleading. But I hope that conclusions about long-run growth in 
the “typical” industrialized nation will be more secure: errors made in describing 
the quantitative shape of growth in individual nations to some degree cancel 
when averages are considered.
The investment estimates used in this paper are typically equal to gross 
investment less retirements. The result is larger than “net investment,” which 
subtracts depreciation on existing capital, but it is smaller than “gross 
investment.” The concept I use is appropriate for aggregate production functions: 
it measures the change in physical capital for use in production.
MACHINERY ACCUMULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Figure 1 plots machinery investment shares and output per capita growth. 
The association is strong, capturing more than half of the variance of output per 
capita growth. The machinery coefficient is large: each percentage point rise in 
machinery investment as a share of output is associated with an increase of 
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Annual Rate of Change of Gross Machinery and Equipment Capital Stock, as 
a Proportion of National Product
The highest-growth, highest-investment points come after World War II. 
This “great Keynesian boom” saw more rapid growth than any previous era. 
Perhaps it was a structural break, and the association of machinery and growth 
in the sample as a whole reflects this break. But this is not the case: post-1950 
growth has been no more rapid on the average than what would have been 
predicted from pre-1950 relations.12
12Little of rapid post-1950 growth in output or the pace of investment in machinery can be 
attributed to replacement of wartime losses. Only Japan and Germany were below their pre- 
World War II growth paths by 1950, and they were not far below. By 1965, all six of the countries 
were above not only their pre-World War II but also their pre-Great Depression growth paths. 





























































































GDP per Capita Growth Regressed on Machinery and non-Machinery
Investment Rates







Population Level Relative 
Growth Rate to U.S. R2 SEE
Full 0.561 0.192 1.47 -0.481 -0.011 0.587 0.0139
(0.157) (0.117) (0.504) (0.009)
Full 0.624 0.167 1.91 -0.543 0.572 0.0140
(0.147) (0.115) (0.504)
Full 0.599 0.127 2.10 -0.011 0.577 0.0139
(0.151) (0.094) (0.009)
Full 0.675 0.101 2.07 -0.373 41.049 0.665 0.0135
Nation Dummies' (0.169) (0.129) (0.609) (0.021)
Full 0.736 0.175 1.80 -0.741 -0.003 0.640 0.0144
Era Dummies" (0.225) (0.138) (0.644) (0.011)
Full 1.227 0.046 3.35 -2.212 -0.031 0.758 0.0130
Nation & Era‘ " (0.266) (0.140) (0.907) (0.026)
'The U.S. alone has a significant nation dummy: +0.0208.
"None of the era dummies are significant.
•"The 1965-79 era coefficient has a significant negative coefficient, the Canada 
and the Ü.S.A. nation coefficients are significant and positive.
Table 1 reports regressions of output per capita growth on investment in 
machinery and on additional variables: the level of output per capita relative to 
America (to take account of possible “convergence,” as follower countries more 
quickly retrace the steps of leaders), the rate of population growth (to take 
account of the burdens of capital widening), the share o f non-residential 
construction investment in national product (to control for the increase in 
productivity produced by other forms of investment besides equipment), and 
separate indicator variables for each nation and era.13 Such nation and era
13“Random effects” estimation, assuming that each nation and each era has its own random 
effect that is in addition to the residual for individual observations, leads to coefficient estimates 




























































































indicator variables partially control for a host of additional influences that are 
nation- and era-specific on the rate of economic growth.14
Table 1 also reports T-statistics on the difference between the coefficient on 
investment in machinery and the coefficient on investment in general. This 
reveals the significance of the partial correlation between growth and machinery 
investment that remains even controlling the correlation between growth and 
investment in general. Consider just the first regression, with the lowest such T- 
statistic: 1.47. An observer thinking the odds were even between machinery 
investment having a stronger or a weaker association with growth than other 
investment, but having no view about the magnitude of the differential would, if 
this regression in Table 1 came as completely new information, believe afterward 
that the odds were 14 to 1 that machinery had the stronger association.
The bottom left comer of the scatter in Figure 1 consists of points—such as 
in the United States from 1929 to 1938, or in Japan from 1938 to 1950—in which 
slow growth or decline in output per capita levels resulted principally not from 
low machinery investment but from the Great Depression, and devastation and 
defeat in war. However, adding additional variables to capture the effect of those 
historical episodes had little effect on the machinery investment coefficient. In 
results not shown, the addition of both Great Depression and war loss indicator 
variables reduced the machinery investment coefficient by only 0.07—half of a 
standard deviation.
The nation and era indicator variables included in the lower regressions of
Table 1 rarely achieve statistical significance.15 It is interesting that there are
estimates that the nation- and era-specific components of the residual are small.
14StiIl other additional variables were also included in results not shown. Direct measures of 
education are noted below. “Defeat in war” indicator variables did not have a noticeable effect on 
the machinery investment coefficient; neither did crude variables measuring the orientation of 
exports toward primary products as opposed to manufactures.
15Nation effects are measured relative to Germany. Era effects are measured relative to the 
initial 1870-85 period. The U.S. indicator is one of the few that is significant; the U.S. has grown 




























































































not significant nation and era effects. They would proxy for important 
variables—like rates of education, impacts of economic policies, or the 
functioning of the international regime—-with differential effects across nations 
and eras. There are surely important determinants o f growth other than 
population growth, machinery and other forms of investment, and “catch-up.” 
But such determinants appear to be neither persistent for any nation—not even 
Japan—nor pervasive in any one era—not even in the Great Depression.
Regressions with both nation and era indicator variables included produced 
very large coefficients on the machinery investment variable, as well as 
implausible estimates of the relationship between population and output per 
capita growth. Including both sets consumed much of the regression’s identifying 
variance, producing coefficient estimates that were potentially untrustworthy. 
For this reason I relied more on the regressions without nation and era-specific 
indicator variables. Their omission might be justified by their small and 
statistically not significant estimated coefficients.
Political Stability
Political stability—an absence of coups, insurrections, and confiscations— 
and a high rate of investment in formal education are two factors featured 
prominently in studies of comparative determinants of growth in the post-World 
War II period.16 It is conceivable that political stability is a key to growth, and
per capita national product relative to the other industrial nations and its rate of equipment 
investment. When the level of output per capita relative to the U.S. is dropped from the 
independent variables, then the U.S. indicator variable loses its significance. The U.S. is an 
exception to the “convergence” toward average productivity levels for the set of industrial nations 
as a whole that is exhibited by other industrial economies. The U.S. has managed to maintain its 
productivity lead for an astonishingly long time. See Abramovitz, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, 
and Falling Behind,” and Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff, Productivity and American Leadership. 
The positive U.S. indicator reveals not that the U.S. has grown faster than expected given its 
rate of machinery investment, but that it has grown faster than expected given its relative 
wealth.




























































































that the strong association of machinery investment and growth comes about 
because a high rate of machinery investment is a result of political stability. It is 
also conceivable that a high rate of investment in formal education is a key to 
growth, and that a high rate of machinery investment is a good indicator that 
other forms of investment are high. The sample contained little evidence to 
support either possibility, however.
The first regressions of table 2 report coefficients estimated when a political 
stability dummy variable is added to the basic specification reported in table 1. 
Political stability comes close to having a statistically significant effect: in the 
specification used in the first line of Table 2, a country without unconstitutional 
changes of government over an era sees GDP per capita grow faster by one 
percentage point per year. Of course, it is not clear to what degree this relation is 
cause and to what degree it is effect. Stagnant living standards can be the result 
of political instability, or they prepare the ground for coups: but for the Great 
Depression, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have come to power in Germany.
However, including a political stability indicator variable in the regressions 
does not materially affect the coefficient on machinery investment. No 
substantial part of the association between machinery investment and economic 
growth arises because political instability both causes slow productivity growth 
















































































































































































'Independent variable is the residual from a regression on the 
log level of GDP/capita.
Investment in Education
In the post-World War II cross-section of nations, a country’s secondary 
school enrollment rate—the proportion of its total population enrolled in 
secondary school—is one of the aggregate education investment indicators most 
strongly associated with economic growth.17 The lower rows of Table 2 report 
coefficients estimated by adding the log of primary and secondary school 
enrollment rates to the list of independent variables. Because education rates 
have an upward secular trend as incomes increase, the independent variable




























































































used is the residual from a regression of log enrollment rates on log GDP per 
capita.
The primary school enrollment variable is not associated with growth. The 
sample of nations is a bad one from the perspective o f identifying the effects of 
primary school enrollment. Near-universal primary education was established in 
most of the nations of the sample by the interwar period, so there is relatively 
little identifying variance.
Secondary school education is only weakly associated with growth once 
machinery investment share is included in the regression: a doubling of the 
secondary school enrollment rate is associated with an increase in GDP per 
capita growth of only 0.3 percent per year.
Moreover, once again adding an independent variable has no noticeable 
impact on the estimated machinery investment share coefficient. There is no 
sign that the strong association between machinery investment and growth 
arises because machinery investment is a good indicator that other kinds of 
investment, like investment in classroom-educated people, are high as well.18
Thus, adding direct measures of education rates does not reduce the 
magnitude or significance of the coefficient on machinery investment. This may 
be entirely due to the inadequacy of official measurements of education rates as 
proxies for the stock of human capital produced by formal education. It is far 
from proof that the formal education received in classrooms is necessarily less 
important for productivity growth than the informal hands-on education gained 
by using the capital goods of the industrial revolution. But it does suggest such a 
possibility.
^Experimentation with other specifications, including the fraction of the school-age population 





























































































Few would argue that machinery investment is not to a degree dependent on 
output growth. Any influence generating faster growth will raise future profits. 
If firms anticipate such an increase they will invest in machinery to capture 
those future profits. Whether causation runs from machinery investment to 
growth or from growth to machinery investment is impossible to say with 
complete confidence. Nevertheless, three pieces of evidence suggest that a 
substantial share of causation runs from higher machinery investment to faster 
growth, not the reverse.
The first piece exploits the distinction between output growth and output per 
capita growth. If faster growth leads to higher investment because of the 
expectation of profits, investment might well respond equally to increases in 
output generated by productivity and to those generated by population. It should 
not matter much whether larger demand comes from having more consumers or 
richer consumers.19
Table 3








Variable Growth Growth Investment R2 SEE
Machinery Investment 0.710 0.319 0.556 0.0137
(0.104) (0.383)
Machinery Investment 0.513 -0.459 0.265 0.627 0.0127
(0.121) (0.458) (0.098)
Table 3 regresses machinery investment rates on output per capita and
19This insight is due to Barry Bosworth, who suggested it to Lawrence Summers. De Long and 
Summers have used it to try to identify causality between machinery investment and growth in 




























































































population growth rates. It shows a strong association between output per capita 
growth and machinery investment and a weaker and imprecisely estimated 
association between population growth (holding output per capita constant) and 
machinery investment. Intensive growth that raises productivity and income 
levels is especially strongly associated with machinery investment.
Figure 2
Post-World War II Growth and Machinery Investment Shares of Output
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A second piece of evidence is the recent, post-World War II experience 
assessed by De Long and Summers, and by Jones.20 Today carries information 
about yesterday: the evidence of the present allows us to “write history 
backwards” i f  we believe that structural relationships change slowly.21 The 
relationship between machinery investment and growth in the post-World War 
II period is as strong as the relationship in the longer-run sample considered 
here, as Figure 2 shows. And there is a strong case to be made that the post-
20“Equipment Investment and Economic Growth,” and Jones, “Economic Growth and Producer 
Durables Prices.” See also Dowrick and Nguyen, “OECD Comparative Catchup and 
Convergence.”




























































































World War II association between machinery investment and growth is causal.
De Long and Summers as well as Jones stressed that in the post-World War 
II period, high machinery investment was strongly correlated with low relative 
prices of machinery and equipment and with rapid growth. If rapid growth 
caused increased machinery investment by increasing demand for machinery, it 
should have raised the relative price of machinery and equipment as well. The 
likelihood that the post-World War II pattern reflects causation running from 
high machinery investment to rapid growth creates, if  we are willing to write 
history backward, a presumption that the same is true in the longer run as well.
National Experiences
The third piece of evidence comes from narrative histories of policy and 
growth in individual nations. Of these histories, perhaps the most powerful and 
disturbing is the case of Argentina. Argentinean long-run national income 
accounts are not sufficiently reliable to include it in the database for the 
regressions underlying Table I. Neverthless, it is worth considering. Up to the 
late 1950s it was as rich as,continental Europe, and had grown rapidly since 
large-scale settlement began in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1929 Argentina 
was perhaps fifth in the world in terms of automobiles per capita. In 1913 
Buenos Aires was in the top 20 among cities of the world in terms of telephones 
per capita. Yet today Argentina is a Third-World nation. Figure 3 plots the 
relative erosion of Argentinean ouput per capita from levels comparable to 





























































































Post-World War II Argentine and European Real GDP per Capita Levels
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro’s Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine 
Republic provides a powerful—albeit controversial—analysis of Argentina’s 
relative decline.22 The Depression had left Argentina justly suspicious of the 
free-trade order: its trading partners had shut it out o f markets to preserve 
domestic employment. Political cleavages had deepened as landowner and 
exporter elites showed an eagerness to abandon democracy to stunt the welfare 
state. In this environment Juan Perón gained support for a program of national 
assertion and populist redistribution.
Perón sought rapid economic growth and the redistribution o f wealth to 
urban workers who had not received their fair share. His program of 
stimulation, price controls, and wage raises produced almost half a decade of 
growth, but then agricultural production and exports fell as the disincentives 
implicit in his program made themselves felt.
The resulting foreign exchange shortage gave Perón only unattractive 
options: devaluation and borrowing from abroad, thus betraying his nationalist 
commitments; internal austerity, causing unemployment and reversing his
22A somewhat different interpretation, dating Argentinean decline from the World War I-era 
cutoff of large-scale British capital investment, is provided by Taylor, “External Dependence, 




























































































redistributions; or controls on imports to balance foreign payments by rationing 
imported goods. Perdn chose this third alternative, believing that growth, a 
continuation of redistribution, and a reduction in dependence on the world 
economy was good. According to Dfaz-Alejandro first priority for foreign 
exchange went to raw materials to keep factories operating, second priority to 
consumption goods to keep workers’ living standards high, and last priority to 
imports of capital goods for investment.
As a result, the early 1950s saw Argentina’s relative prices of producer 
durables rise to more than twice world levels. Each percentage point of output 
saved and committed to the purchase of machinery produced less than one-half a 
percentage point’s worth of real machinery investment. Even though the 1945 to 
1955 government had boasted of its role in encouraging industrialization, Di'az 
Alejandro calculated that “[rjemarkably, the capital stock in electricity and 
communications increased by a larger percentage during the depression years 
1929-39 than during 1945-55.”
Subsequent governments moderated but did not roll back Peronist policies. 
The interest groups that benefitted from them had loud voices, and shaky 
governments shrank from policy moves that would redistribute wealth away 
from urban workers back out to the countryside. In spite of a healthy national 
savings rate, Argentinean rates of machinery investment have been low since 
World War II. And the economy has stagnated.
The case of post-World War II Argentina finds its opposite in post-World 
War II West Germany. Post-World War II Argentina was thought to have a 
bright economic future. Post-World War II West Germany was seen as likely to 
require a generation to regain its previous relative economic position. Yet as 
Figure 3 also shows, between 1950 and 1960 West German national product per 
capita gained 35 percent relative to France and 45 percent relative to Britain, 




























































































During this decade of the Wirtschaftswunder, real returns on the German 
stock market averaged 24 percent per year. Such high rates of stock price growth 
indicate that Germany’s growth leap of the 1950s was a surprise: had investors 
foreseen rapid economic growth, they would have bid stock prices up to higher 
levels in the early 1950s in anticipation. Belief in rapid growth of the magnitude 
seen in the Wirtschaftswunder was the exception, not the rule, in post-World 
War II Germany. Thus it is not possible to claim that high machinery 
investment in Germany between 1950 and 1965 was induced by a high demand 
for machinery by firms anticipating rapid economic growth: by and large 
Germans—at least Germans investing in the stock market—did not anticipate 
the bright future that in fact lay ahead. If Germany’s high machinery 
investment in the early post-World War II period is related to its growth miracle, 
it is as cause, not as consequence.
TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The macro pattern sketched above is of a strong association between 
machinery investment and economic growth, an association that some evidence 
suggests reflects a strong causal chain running from the former to the latter. 
This macro pattern is consistent with a picture of the micro structure of 
innovation that historians of technology have been drawing for generations.23 As 
Nathan Rosenberg puts it, “...inventions are relatively crude and inefficient [at 
first]....They are, of necessity, badly adapted to many of the[ir] ultimate 
uses...they offer only small advantages, or perhaps none at all.” Rosenberg 
concludes that “the pace at which... improvements are made will be a major 
determinant of the rate of diffusion.,..[I]mproving a process contributes even
23Rosenberg, “The Historiography of Technical Progress,” excellently surveys work on the 
history of technology. Rosenberg’s survey was written before, and thus omits, Hounshell’s superb 




























































































more to technological progress than does its initial development.”24
Consider three classic and exemplary studies. First, Fishlow’s study of 
American railroad productivity found that over the forty years from 1870 to 1910 
the lion’s share of cost reduction was contributed by incremental changes in the 
design of freight cars and locomotives; one by one, these changes were small and 
barely noticed, but over 40 years they doubled the effective power of locomotives 
and to a tripling of the effective capacity of freight cars.25
Second, a similar pattern holds in the past two decades in the computerized 
tomography industry: initial invention had relatively small benefits, but the 
subsequent explosion of innovation and adaptation changed a curiosity into a 
very valuable diagnostic device. The wave of small innovations—-themselves 
separate from, though unthinkable without the initial invention—contributed 
most of the value of the innovation.26
Third, recall Hunter’s famous study of the development of the steamboat. 
Both the engine and the principles of ship design were borrowings from Britain, 
yet the developed American steamboat had a different kind of engine, a different 
strength of frame, a different shape of hull, a different form of superstructure— 
no feature of the original British design was kept without major modification.27
Case studies cannot prove a general pattern. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that historians who have examined the process of technological development 
have for the most part stressed the process of feedback and incremental 
improvements in operation and design. A similar stress on incremental 
improvements can be found in studies of technology adaptation by countries not
24Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology .
25Fishlow, “Productivity and Technological Change in the Railroad Sector.”
26See Trajtenberg, Economic Analysis o f Product Innovation. Similar patterns can be found even 
in technologies that appear at first glance stable, as Rosenberg’s Perspectives on Technology 
stresses.




























































































at the forefront of invention and innovation. How are such incremental 
improvements made? Clearly they can only be made by those who are already 
very familiar with the technology and its uses. Without workers and managers 
with hands-on experience, the process of technology transfer and technological 
adaptation becomes impossibly difficult. Feedback from users and small 
adaptations of machines and organizations lies at the heart of the stories of 
productivity growth narrated by technological historians. Such a pattern 
strongly suggests that rapid productivity growth requires intimate experience 
with—and abundant accumulation of—the machinery in which the technologies 
that need to be adapted are embodied.
Thus the macro association of machinery investment and growth and the 
micro studies in the history of technology may be pieces of the same puzzle. On 
the macro side, rapid machinery accumulation is associated with rapid 
productivity growth and appears to yield large social benefits to the economy in 
terms of higher productivity. Benefits of the magnitude suggested by the 
machinery investment coefficients in Table 1—fifty percent per year or more— 
dwarf the profits that the investors in the capital goods are able to directly 
appropriate. On the micro side, active experience with technologies is a 
necessary prerequisite to developing them further, or to using them productively.
CONCLUSION
The association between machinery investment and growth in this sample is 
very strong. The estimated coefficients suggest that each additional percentage 
point of total output devoted to investment in machinery raises output per 
worker growth by more than half a percentage point per year. This might be 
taken to imply a gross social rate of return on equipment investment of more 




























































































even allowing for the rapid depreciation of machinery. Investors’ profits earned 
from the purchase and use of machinery are an order of magnitude lower than 
these possible social returns.
This high estimate may be too high, however. The nations in the sample are, 
today, wealthy and successfully industrialized economies. Circumstances have 
broken in their favor over the past century. The high coefficient may to some 
degree be capturing the good luck that these economies in the sample have had; 
a different sample might well have led to different conclusions.28
One obvious addition to the sample that would have done so is the Soviet 
Union: since Stalin took absolute power at the end of the 1920’s, the Soviet 
Union’s five-year plans called for extraordinarily heavy rates of investment in 
machinery. Yet the Soviet Union achieved very poor productivity growth rates by 
the standards of the industrial West. The inefficiency of the Soviet economy in 
translating inputs into outputs is one of the most fascinating and heartbreaking 
stories of twentieth-century economic history. Yet its experience serves as a 
warning to governments seeking to industrialize and accelerate growth; the type 
of machinery investment that leads to rapid growth appears to be the type 
generated by private firms and market allocation processes, not by central 
planners.
Nevertheless, the experience of the past century is that those countries that 
have grown most rapidly have been those that have invested very heavily in 
machinery. There is a case that their rapid growth is in large part due to this 
investment; it enabled their workers and firms to gain experience with and thus 
to master the technologies of the Industrial Revolution embodied in machinery. 
This is a vision of the process of economic growth is familiar to economic 
historians. The fit between their micro narratives and the macro patterns should
28The strong post-World War II association of machinery and growth suggests that more than 
“good luck” is at work. However, in the post-World War II cross-section the association between 




























































































lead them to place more confidence in their narratives of machinery investment 
and innovation—and to be more confident that they have much to teach other 
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